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FIXING SOFT DOLLARS IS NOT THAT HARD:
A CONSENT AND REPORTING FRAMEWORK
FOR REGULATING CLIENT COMMISSION
ARRANGEMENTS
BRENDAN BIFFANY†
ABSTRACT
Under soft dollar arrangements, investment advisers promise
portfolio trades to participating brokers in exchange for investment
research or other benefits. Recently, some academics, financial
regulators, and practitioners have scrutinized such arrangements,
arguing that they provide an avenue for advisers to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense of their clients. However, others defend soft
dollar arrangements, seeing them as a mechanism for binding advisers
to clients and increasing client returns.
A safe harbor currently protects advisers’ use of soft dollars, so long
as certain minimum requirements are met. Critics argue that soft dollars
should be banned outright, contending that advisers should be required
to pay for all investment research and advisory benefits out of their own
pocket rather than by using clients’ commissions. Supporters
recommend maintaining the status quo, arguing that the safe harbor
promotes access to diverse research that, ultimately, benefits clients.
This Note analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of soft dollar
arrangements, the original rationales for the development of the soft
dollar safe harbor, and the agency costs and conflicts of interest
inherent in maintaining the safe harbor. This Note advocates a middle
ground between maintaining the status quo and banning soft dollars
outright: a consent and reporting framework for the use of soft dollars
that is consistent with general principles of agency and the fiduciary
duties that advisers owe their clients.
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INTRODUCTION
Through soft dollar brokerage arrangements, investment advisers
can use their clients’ trading commissions to pay for research and
brokerage services. Although the use of such arrangements is “virtually
invisible” to individual clients,1 soft dollars constitute a billion-dollar
industry2 in the United States that touches more than ninety-five
million people.3 Almost all investment advisers have soft dollar
arrangements with the broker-dealers4 that carry out their clients’
transactions.5
To understand how soft dollar arrangements work, consider the
following scenario: A parent gives a babysitter ten dollars to buy his
kids some ice cream. Although ice cream usually costs five dollars per
pint, the babysitter finds a great deal: four pints for ten dollars. She
uses the full ten dollars to buy four pints, gives two to the children, and
keeps the other two without telling the family, using them when she
watches another family’s kids or keeping them for herself.
Real soft dollar arrangements are not so different. Clients hire
investment advisers to research, identify, and execute portfolio
transactions. When an adviser identifies a trade, he contracts with a
broker-dealer to execute the trade for the client on the most
advantageous terms possible. The adviser has a choice in selecting a
broker-dealer: route the trade through a discount broker that charges
a commission rate of approximately two cents per share, or, as happens
more often, route the trade through a premium broker at a rate of

1. D. Bruce Johnsen, Property Rights to Investment Research: The Agency Costs of Soft
Dollar Brokerage, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 75, 77 (1994).
2. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
INSPECTION REPORT ON THE SOFT DOLLAR PRACTICES OF BROKER-DEALERS, INVESTMENT
ADVISERS, AND MUTUAL FUNDS (Sept. 22, 1998) [hereinafter INSPECTION REPORT],
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/softdolr.htm [https://perma.cc/EE5H-8U63].
3. Sarah Holden, Daniel Schrass & Michael Bogdan, Ownership of Mutual Funds,
Shareholder Sentiment, and Use of the Internet, 2016, 22 ICI RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE 1, 2 (2016)
(finding, in mid-2016, that there were 95.8 million U.S. individuals invested in some type of
registered fund, including mutual funds). This statistic may be under inclusive, as it does not
include those solely invested in individual accounts through private investment advisers that
employ soft dollars. Id.
4. A broker is an individual who, for a small commission fee, matches buyers and sellers of
securities in an exchange. A dealer is an individual who purchases securities at one price from a
seller and then sells those securities later to a buyer at a slightly higher price, profiting from the
price discrepancy. A broker-dealer acts as both as a broker and a dealer.
5. See INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 2 (“[A]lmost all advisers obtain products and
services (both proprietary and third-party) other than pure execution from broker-dealers.”).
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about six cents per share.6 While either kind of broker can execute the
transaction, premium brokers provide advisers with additional
research or brokerage services that advisers can use in managing their
clients’ accounts—soft dollar benefits. Although these benefits accrue
to the adviser, the broker’s commission cost comes directly out of the
client’s holdings.7
Investment advisers must abide by fiduciary duties in managing
their clients’ accounts.8 These include the general common-law duties
of care and loyalty, which require the adviser to seek “the most
favorable terms” for the execution of client transactions that are
“reasonably available under the circumstances.”9 However, federal law
contains a safe harbor provision that protects investment advisers when
they receive soft dollar benefits: Advisers are allowed to use research
and brokerage services paid for by one client for the benefit of any of
their clients without breaching their fiduciary duties, so long as the
commission paid is “reasonable” compared to the services received.10
Thus, an adviser can disregard whether his receipts will actually benefit
the client that paid for them and, instead, seek out services that benefit
other clients’ accounts. In other words, although soft dollar benefits
that accrue from a single client’s commission should, in theory, belong
to that client,11 an adviser is free to use the benefits broadly instead.
While conflicts of interest inhere in all investment-advisory
relationships,12 two conflicts specifically relate to advisers’ use of soft

6. Stephen M. Horan & D. Bruce Johnsen, Can Third-Party Payments Benefit the
Principal? The Case of Soft Dollar Brokerage, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 56, 57–58 (2008).
7. Typically, the price of purchased securities includes the commission. For example, if a
stock is trading at $10.00 per share, the cost to the client to purchase one share of the stock would
be approximately $10.02 if the trade is routed through a discount broker, but $10.06 if routed
through a premium broker.
8. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977) (interpreting a prior
Supreme Court decision as “recognition that Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act to
establish federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers”).
9. Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 1998).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1) (2012).
11. See SOFT DOLLAR STANDARDS § IA1 (CFA INST. 2011) (creating soft dollar standards
for CFA Institute members centered on the fundamental principle that “[b]rokerage is the
property of the Client”).
12. For example, investment advisers usually earn a flat fee based on the value of assets
under management. Accordingly, advisers have little incentive to research trades intensively; they
will only receive “a small share of any wealth increase they generate.” Johnsen, supra note 1, at
87. When trades are not well researched, clients become worse off. Further, unscrupulous brokerdealers can cheat advisers and their clients by poorly executing trades, costing the client money
but saving the broker-dealer the cost of proper trade execution. Id.
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dollars. First, the safe harbor described above creates conflicts between
an adviser’s various clients, as advisers need not use soft dollars to
benefit the specific client whose commissions generated them. Second,
under the guise of receiving research or brokerage services, an adviser
may use soft dollars generated from client commissions to enrich
himself—and trade excessively to increase the value of said
enrichment.13 For example, advisers have used soft dollars to pay for
general administrative expenses,14 simply pocketed the money,15 and
engaged in any number of specific abuses,16 like using soft dollars to
make rent,17 covering personal travel expenses18 and vacation
timeshare fees,19 and paying $300,000 toward a marital settlement.20
Unsurprisingly, one former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Christopher Cox, has called soft dollars a “witch’s brew
of hidden fees, conflicts of interest and complexity . . . at odds with the
investor’s best interest.”21
In light of these abuses, the current framework governing soft
dollar arrangements should be adjusted, and the safe harbor should be
repealed. By creating the safe harbor, Congress has allowed advisers
incredible discretion in their use of soft dollars. The safe harbor runs
contrary to both advisers’ fiduciary duties and the principles of agency

13. See, e.g., Sage Advisory Servs. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 7997, 2001 WL 849405,
at *2 (July 27, 2001) (finding that an adviser misappropriated almost $900,000 in soft dollar credits
and churned client accounts to generate more credits). This may also motivate an adviser to select
a broker-dealer based on research rather than execution capability.
14. See, e.g., INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 2 (stating that advisers have used soft dollars
to pay for office rent, equipment, cellular phone services, and other administrative costs).
15. See, e.g., SEC v. Sweeney Capital Mgmt. Inc., Litigation Release No. 15664, 1998 WL
102672, at *1 (Mar. 10, 1998) (finding that an investment adviser misappropriated $109,000 in soft
dollars to pay for, among other things, artwork, furniture, and other personal expenses).
16. See Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section 28(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 54165, 2005 WL 4843294, at
*2 n.8 (July 18, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Guidance] (listing examples of SEC enforcement actions
involving client commission practices).
17. INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 2.
18. Dawson-Samberg Capital Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1889, 2000
WL 1092961, at *3 (Aug. 3, 2000).
19. J.S. Oliver Capital Mgmt., LP, Securities Act Release No. 10100, 2016 WL 3361166, at
*7 (June 17, 2016).
20. Id.
21. Joseph Giannone, SEC Head Urges Crackdown on “Soft Dollar” Deals, REUTERS (May
31, 2007, 2:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/businesspro-sec-softdollars-dc/sec-head-urgescrackdown-on-soft-dollar-deals-idUSN3122527720070531 [https://perma.cc/VXT7-TSF9].
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that underlie investor-adviser relationships.22 And the original
rationales for the safe harbor—promoting the availability of
investment research and protecting those advisers that use soft dollar
arrangements, but lack sufficient technology to prove compliance with
their fiduciary duties—no longer hold.
Still, soft dollar arrangements should not be banned entirely.
When employed effectively and in each client’s best interest, soft dollar
arrangements can be beneficial. Soft dollars can serve to bind the
broker-dealer executing the trade to the adviser, and the adviser to the
client, which helps to minimize the agency costs of investment
relationships.23 Empirical evidence also shows that using soft dollars
can increase investor returns.24
If Congress were to repeal the soft dollar safe harbor, the general
agency laws and fiduciary duties that underlie other agency
relationships would govern soft dollar arrangements instead. These
fiduciary duties generally require the agent to make full disclosure of
all material facts to the principal and gain the principal’s consent.25 In
keeping with this typical standard, the SEC should require investment
advisers to obtain consent from their clients before engaging in soft
dollar arrangements that use client commission dollars. Then, the SEC
should impose detailed periodic reporting requirements on advisers’
soft dollar use, including a quantitative requirement—presenting the
commission dollars spent and the soft dollar benefits received—and a
qualitative requirement—discussing how the soft dollar benefits
received by the adviser are used in the client’s individual best interest.
By requiring advisers to periodically let their use of client commissions
see the light of day, this consent and reporting framework would deter
abuse and, in turn, help clients determine whether their advisers are
acting in their individual best interests.

22. See In re Hughes, Exchange Act Release No. 4048, 1948 WL 29537, at *4 (Apr. 1, 1948)
(“The very function of furnishing investment counsel on a fee basis . . . cultivates a confidential
and intimate relationship and imposes a duty upon [the adviser] to act in the best interests of her
clients and to make only such recommendations as will best serve such interest.”), aff’d sub nom.,
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
23. Johnsen, supra note 1, at 87.
24. Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 74−75 (finding, through an empirical study, that
premium commissions are positively related to management fees in the private wealth
management context).
25. See Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000)
(stating that conflicted transactions will be upheld if the interested party makes full disclosure of
material facts and gains approval to undertake the transaction).
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This Note proceeds as follows: Part I provides a background on
soft dollars and their current regulatory framework. Part II discusses
the benefits and drawbacks of soft dollar arrangements. Part III
analyzes why the soft dollar safe harbor should be repealed. Finally,
Part IV sets forth a new consent-and-reporting framework for soft
dollar arrangements.
I. BACKGROUND ON SOFT DOLLARS AND THE CURRENT
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. The History of Soft Dollars and the Development of Section 28(e)
From the founding of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in
179226 until 1975, brokers’ commissions were fixed at 0.25 percent27—a
rate far above the cost of executing a trade. In the years leading up to
1975, however, the securities industry underwent a period of drastic
change. Prior to 1940, most securities were held by private, individual
investors. But, after the Investment Company Act of 1940
implemented regulations governing mutual funds and other pooled
investment vehicles, investor confidence in those products increased,
spurring tremendous growth in institutional portfolio and mutual fund
holdings.28 As institutional holdings grew, brokerage firms began
competing to win the increasing trade volume and size caused by this
concentration.29 Since the fixed commission rate was inflated above
execution cost, brokers began to offer non-price concessions to
incentivize advisers to send trades their way.30 Because just a handful
of full-service brokerage firms produced most of the industry’s
investment research,31 one popular concession became the “research
rebate,” whereby brokers would provide institutional advisers with inhouse research, free of charge, by bundling the cost of research into

26. PETER WYCKOFF, WALL STREET AND THE STOCK MARKETS: A CHRONOLOGY (1644–
1971) 145 (1972).
27. James F. Jorden, “Paying Up” for Research: A Regulatory and Legislative Analysis, 1975
DUKE L.J. 1103, 1105 n.6 (1975).
28. See INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 170 (57th ed. 2017)
(finding the number of dollars invested in mutual funds to have grown from $0.45 billion across
sixty-eight funds in 1940 to $45.87 billion across 426 funds by 1975).
29. Johnsen, supra note 1, at 81.
30. Id.
31. D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance: Law and Economics, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 1545, 1556 (2009) [hereinafter Johnsen, SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance].
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their fixed commissions.32 Thus began the development of soft dollar
arrangements.
Over time, investors came to express displeasure with the fixedcommission regime. The high fixed commission cost made it difficult
for individual investors to participate in the stock market, as
individuals did not trade in large enough volumes to warrant any
special incentives like the research rebate.33 Advances in technology
and the concentrating of assets in the hands of large institutional
investors prompted advisers to begin developing their own internal
research, lessening their reliance on broker rebates.34 And, in 1963, the
Supreme Court delivered a big blow to fixed commissions when it ruled
that the NYSE was not exempt from antitrust laws,35 causing some to
suggest that fixed commissions should be outlawed as an
anticompetitive practice.36
In light of these developments, Congress and the SEC decided to
make commissions fully negotiable on national securities exchanges in
1975.37 With this change, brokerage commissions decreased and
trading volumes surged.38 Still, most broker-dealers continued to
bundle their research and execution costs into a single commission.39
Although many institutional advisers had begun developing their own
internal research, reliance on broker-provided research remained
significant.40 Many advisers still depended on the research provided by

32. Id. at 1557.
33. See Kenneth Silber, The Great Unfixing, THINKADVISOR (May 1, 2010, 4:00 AM),
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2010/05/01/the-great-unfixing/
[https://perma.cc/5NQ8-XQV6]
(stating that “[t]he high costs of trading discouraged broad public participation” in the stock
market).
34. Johnsen, SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance, supra note 31, at 1556.
35. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364–65 (1963).
36. See Silber, supra note 33 (noting that in the aftermath of Silver, the Department of Justice
asked the SEC to consider whether fixed commissions should be considered an illegal
anticompetitive practice).
37. See Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 107–08 (1975)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1) (2012)) (“[N]o national securities exchange may
impose any schedule or fix rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other fees to be charged
by its members.”).
38. Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of
Deregulation, 27 J.L. & ECON. 273, 274 (1984).
39. Johnsen, supra note 1, at 76.
40. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 69 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 247–48 (“The
extent to which a particular investment manager relies on brokerage research varies
considerably.”).
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broker-dealers and wanted to retain those research sources.41 With
commissions freely negotiable, however, advisers worried about
breaching their fiduciary duties to their clients if they did not seek the
absolute lowest execution cost for portfolio transactions.42 But seeking
trade execution at the discount rate would require advisers to sacrifice
the opportunity to receive research benefits.
To allay these concerns, Congress enacted Section 28(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as part of the Securities Act
Amendments of 1975.43 Section 28(e) provides a safe harbor against a
breach of fiduciary duty for advisers who engage in soft dollar
brokerage practices, provided certain criteria are met.44 To take
advantage of the safe harbor, the adviser must believe, in good faith,
that any premium commission paid is reasonable in relation to the
research or brokerage services received.45 When that condition and
others are met, advisers can “pay up” for research services without
breaching their fiduciary duties to their clients.
B. The Structure of a Typical Soft Dollar Arrangement
A typical advisory arrangement looks like this: Investors hire
advisers to manage their funds. Each investor has a separate account,
with separate goals, and the advisers manage each accordingly. In the
case of a mutual fund, investors put their money into a single pool that
the adviser manages according to the pool’s singular mandate.46 A
single mutual fund adviser will often manage multiple mutual funds,
each according to different mandates.
Whether managing mutual funds or private accounts, advisers set
up arrangements with brokers to execute their trades. These
arrangements take one of two general forms. In the first iteration, the
adviser and broker might agree that when the adviser sends trades to

41. See C. Meyrick Payne, “Follow the Money” to Understand Soft Dollars, MUTUAL FUND
GOVERNANCE CONSULTING, http://production.mfgovern.com/content/view/32/105/ [https://
perma.cc/826U-46J9] (“When the rules changed, investment managers wanted to retain their
research sources.”).
42. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 70.
43. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1) (2012).
45. Id.
46. Examples of mutual fund mandates include investing only in large-capitalization-value
stocks, investing only in medium-term, investment-grade, fixed-income securities, or managing a
balanced portfolio while adjusting the riskiness of included securities based on a target retirement
year.
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the broker, the broker will credit the adviser’s account with soft dollar
credits—say, $0.50 worth of credits for every $1.00 worth of brokerage
commissions.47 As the adviser trades with the broker, his soft dollar
credit balance increases. Later, the adviser can exchange the
accumulated balance for research and brokerage services provided by
the broker.
The second form is for the broker, in advance, to provide credits
to pay a portion of the adviser’s research bill with an independent
research provider. In return, the adviser agrees to send the broker
future trades at premium commission rates. For example, the broker
may provide the adviser with $200,000 of research credits up front if
the adviser agrees to send the broker trades over a certain period of
time to generate $400,000 in brokerage commissions, which would be
considerably more than the amount required to cover the broker’s
execution costs.48 Notably, under this kind of arrangement, the
adviser’s duty to seek best execution49 eliminates any obligation to
continue sending trades to the broker if the adviser feels the broker is
inadequately executing the trades.50
Under both types of agreement, the clients pay the brokerage
commissions, not the adviser. Thus, soft dollar arrangements allow
advisers to employ clients’ premium commission dollars in order to
obtain research and brokerage services for their own use.
C. The Soft Dollar Safe Harbor’s Scope
The financial regulatory framework in the United States promotes
soft dollars by providing a safe harbor for their use. Section 28(e)’s safe
harbor provides that
[n]o person . . . in the exercise of investment discretion with respect
to an account shall be deemed to have acted unlawfully or to have
breached a fiduciary duty under State or Federal law . . . solely by
reason of his having caused the account to pay a . . . broker . . . an
amount of commission for effecting a securities transaction in excess

47. See, e.g., Marvin & Palmer Assocs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1841, 1999
WL 777443, at *2 (Sep. 30, 1999) (describing a brokerage arrangement whereby the adviser
“receives $[0].50 in soft dollar credits for each $1.00 in brokerage directed to the Broker.”).
48. See Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 58 (providing a similar example arrangement).
49. On the duty of best execution, see JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C.
LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1032–33 (7th ed. 2015)
(describing the scope of the duty of best execution).
50. See Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 58 (“[T]he manager is free to terminate the broker
at any time with no legal obligation to make the promised trades.”).
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of the amount of the commission another . . . broker . . . would have
charged for effecting that transaction, if such person determined in
good faith that such amount of commission was reasonable in relation
to the value of the brokerage and research services provided . . .
viewed in terms of either that particular transaction or his overall
responsibilities with respect to the accounts as to which he exercises
investment discretion.51

Thus, if an adviser meets certain requirements when undertaking a soft
dollar arrangement, the safe harbor prevents the adviser from
breaching his fiduciary duties by paying premium commissions to
receive soft dollar benefits. To take advantage of the safe harbor, an
adviser (1) must have “investment discretion” over a client’s account,52
(2) can only receive “brokerage and research services” in exchange for
the premium commission53 which (3) must be “provided by” the broker
effecting the transaction,54 and (4) must determine “in good faith” that
the commission paid was “reasonable” in light of the brokerage and
research services he receives.55
Only “brokerage and research services” qualify for the soft dollar
safe harbor.56 Section 28(e) itself defines research services as “advice,”
“analyses,” or “reports.”57 This research must be “the expression of
reasoning or knowledge” and provide “lawful and appropriate
assistance in making investment decisions,”58 in addition to analyzing

51. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1) (2012).
52. Id. Section 3(a)(35) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines a person exercising
investment discretion as someone “authorized to determine what securities or other property
shall be purchased or sold by or for the account.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(35).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1).
54. Id. To “effect the transaction,” the broker executes, clears, or settles the trade. Id. Of
course, when a broker provides an adviser with its own proprietary research or brokerage services
the “provided by” requirement is met. Id. But the requirement can cause confusion when a broker
does not provide its own proprietary research, but, rather, provides the adviser with soft dollar
credits that the adviser can use to purchase third-party research. So long as the broker is legally
obligated to pay for the product, the broker will be considered to have provided the research.
Interpretive Release Concerning the Scope of Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Related Matters, Exchange Act Release No. 23170, 1986 WL 630442, at *5–6 (Apr. 23,
1986) [hereinafter 1986 Guidance].
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1). The scope of these requirements has been clarified through SEC
interpretive releases, most recently in 2006. 2006 Guidance, supra note 16.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1).
57. Id. § 78bb(e)(3)(A)–(B).
58. 2006 Guidance, supra note 16, at *15–16. The lawful and appropriate assistance standard
focuses on how a manager uses eligible research. For example, an adviser that uses client
commissions to pay for analyses of account performance would not be protected by the safe
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certain subject matter59 to qualify. Under this definition, verbal reports
on company performance from corporate executives,60 seminars and
conferences relating to research, and traditional stock or economic
reports may all be eligible for safe harbor protection.61 Importantly,
though, the travel and expenses related to obtaining research services
are not protected.62
Section 28(e) defines brokerage services as the effectuation of
securities transactions and “functions incidental thereto.”63 These
incidental functions include, among other things, clearance
(reconciling orders between transacting parties), settlement
(effectuating the exchange of money for securities), and custody.64 To
the extent that any brokerage or research services are mixed-use,
where part of the service qualifies under the safe harbor and part of it
does not, the adviser may only use client commission dollars to pay for
the portion that qualifies.65 Additionally, in order to benefit from the
safe harbor, the adviser must make a good-faith effort66 to determine
whether any premium commission paid is reasonable in light of the
products and services received.67 The reasonableness of services
received, as compared to the commission paid, can be “viewed in terms
of either [the specific client] transaction or his overall responsibilities

harbor if those analyses were used for marketing purposes, because marketing does not aid in
investment decision making. Id. at *19.
59. The statute lists “advice . . . as to the value of securities, the advisability of investing in . . .
securities, and the availability of securities” or “analyses and reports concerning issuers,
industries, securities, economic factors and trends, portfolio strategy, and the performance of
accounts” as the research subject matters that qualify for the safe harbor. 15 U.S.C §
78bb(e)(3)(A)–(B).
60. The form the research takes—for example, whether oral or written—is irrelevant to
whether it falls under the safe harbor. 2006 Guidance, supra note 16, at *11.
61. Id. at *12.
62. Id. at *12 n.92.
63. 15 U.S.C § 78bb(e)(3)(C) (2012).
64. Id. The SEC applies a “temporal standard” when considering whether brokerage services
are eligible under the safe harbor. 2006 Guidance, supra note 16, at *17. The safe harbor
encompasses brokerage “services related to execution of securities transactions begin[ning] when
an order is transmitted to a broker-dealer and end[ing] at the conclusion of clearance and
settlement of the transaction.” Id. For example, long-term custody services do not qualify under
the safe harbor because they continue past the clearance and settlement of the transaction. Id. at
*19.
65. 2006 Guidance, supra note 16, at *20.
66. The burden of proof lies with the adviser to demonstrate his good-faith determination.
Id. at *20–21. While good faith can be difficult to prove, research offered at an unbundled rate
with a known market value can help the adviser make a good-faith determination. Id. at *21.
67. 15 U.S.C § 78bb(e)(1).
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with respect to the accounts as to which he exercises investment
discretion.”68 This allows the adviser to disregard the question of
whether the soft dollar benefits he receives directly benefit the account
that generated the benefits.69 Instead, one client’s commissions can be
used to purchase services that primarily or entirely benefit other
clients’ accounts.
In short, by meeting the safe harbor’s requirements, advisers can
cause their clients to pay premium commissions for soft dollar
benefits—and use those benefits as they please—without breaching
their fiduciary duties.70 Still, if at least one requirement is not met, the
adviser cannot take advantage of the safe harbor, and soft dollar use
becomes regulated by the traditional fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty.71
D. Required Disclosures for Soft Dollar Arrangements
As fiduciaries, advisers have a duty to disclose to their clients all
material information regarding potential or actual conflicts of
interest.72 In addition to this general duty, advisers engaged in soft
dollar arrangements must comply with all federal securities law
disclosure requirements, whether or not the arrangements fall within
the Section 28(e) safe harbor.73 Currently, primary soft dollar
disclosures are housed in Form ADV, the main disclosure document
for advisers.74 Advisers are required to deliver Form ADV to each

68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 70 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 247 (“It is thus
unnecessary for the money manager to show that specific services benefitted specific accounts.”).
For example, assume Client A only trades in fixed income securities. Client A’s premium
commission dollars can be used to purchase equity research, even though Client A will never
benefit from that research. A similar outcome holds in the case of mutual funds managed to
specific security-based mandates. However, almost all types of research will benefit mutual funds
managed to target retirement dates or those that employ balanced asset allocations.
70. 15 U.S.C § 78bb(e)(1).
71. As agents, investment advisers owe fiduciary duties to their clients. See Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977) (stating that the Supreme Court recognized “that
Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act to establish federal fiduciary standards for
investment advisers.”). The safe harbor presents only a narrow exception to those duties; if its
requirements are not met, normal fiduciary duties apply.
72. 1986 Guidance, supra note 54, at *6 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963)).
73. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(2).
74. In the mutual fund context, Form N-1A also requires a description of how transactions
in portfolio securities are processed, as well general descriptions of how brokers are selected and
how the reasonableness of commissions paid is evaluated. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM N-
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client when they first contract and annually thereafter.75 Form ADV
contains a wealth of information, both general—statements regarding
the adviser’s ownership and affiliations, and the education of its
managers—and specific—disclosures on matters like soft dollar usage
and disciplinary events, as well as fee schedules for the advisory
services offered.76 The soft dollar disclosures included in Form ADV
are generally qualitative and descriptive in nature, putting clients on
notice of the existence of soft dollar arrangements,77 but revealing little
about their advisers’ actual use of soft dollars.
Clients receive additional information about their advisers’ soft
dollar usage in Form ADV’s Part II, Item 12, which houses brokerage
practice disclosures. Its purpose is to help clients evaluate any conflicts
of interest inherent in their advisers’ arrangements by providing
material information about the advisers’ brokerage practices.78 Item 12
requires disclosure of the factors considered in selecting brokers and
determining their compensation.79 And Item 12 requires advisers to
disclose any conflicts of interest created by soft dollar benefits they
receive.80
Soft dollar disclosures under Item 12 include three general
statements. First, advisers must explain that they benefit when they use
client brokerage commissions to obtain research or brokerage services
because they do not have to pay for those products themselves.81
Second, advisers must disclose that they have an incentive to select a
broker based on their own interest in receiving research, rather than
the client’s interest in receiving the most favorable execution terms.82
And third, advisers must disclose the fact that they may cause clients

1A, at Item 21 (2017). Mutual funds must also disclose the amount of transactions and
commissions directed to certain brokers in exchange for research services. Id.
75. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3(b) (2017).
76. Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Mar. 11, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersformadvhtm.html [https://perma.cc/9AUB-L5P9].
77. See Disclosure of Brokerage Placement Practices by Registered Investment Companies
and Certain Other Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6019, 1979 WL 405250, at *1 (Jan. 30, 1979)
[hereinafter 1979 Release] (describing Form ADV’s disclosures as “narrative, but not statistical,
disclosure requirements”).
78. See id. at *5–7 (discussing the background and purpose of the disclosures required in
what is now Item 12 of Form ADV).
79. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV, at Part 2, Item 12 (2017).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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to pay commissions greater than those charged by discount brokers in
order to receive soft dollar benefits.83
Item 12 also requires some specific soft dollar disclosures. An
adviser must disclose whether he uses soft dollar benefits to service all
client accounts or only the accounts that paid for the benefits.84 In
doing so, he must disclose whether he seeks to allocate soft dollar
benefits proportionally according to the credits each client account
generates.85 And the adviser must disclose the general types of
products and services he acquired with client commissions,86 as well as
the procedures he used to direct client transactions to premium
brokers.87
Form ADV’s disclosures represent baseline, mandatory
requirements. However, under current SEC guidance, more
disclosures may be necessary to ensure that clients receive all material
information regarding adviser brokerage placement practices.88
Outside of Form ADV, advisers must quantitatively disclose the
aggregate dollar amounts of brokerage commissions paid in each of the
last three years to affiliated brokers.89
Even with Form ADV’s disclosure requirements, clients are left
with an imperfect picture of their advisers’ soft dollar usage. Required
disclosures are generally qualitative rather than quantitative, which
inhibits clients’ understanding of how their advisers’ policies affect
them individually and stifles effective monitoring. Furthermore, these
brokerage practice disclosures are just one small part of a very lengthy
document covering a multitude of topics. In this sea of information,
what is not required to be disclosed becomes as important as what is
required. Despite SEC Rule 204-2’s requirement that the adviser

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The adviser must only “state the types of products . . . or services obtained with enough
specificity so that clients can understand what is being obtained” and “need not list individually
each product . . . or service received.” 1986 Guidance, supra note 54, at *7 n.29.
87. FORM ADV, supra note 79, at Item 12(1)(f).
88. 1979 Release, supra note 77, at *4.
89. Id. at *7–8. Affiliated brokers are those that have non-arm’s-length relationships with
advisers. For the most recent fiscal year, advisers must also disclose the percentage of total
brokerage commissions paid to each affiliated broker and the percentage of transactions, in dollar
value, involving each affiliated broker. Id. at *8.
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“make and keep true, accurate and current . . . books and records”90
containing “sufficient details relating to each [soft dollar]
transaction,”91 there are surprisingly few quantitative disclosure
requirements. Quantitative disclosure of the value of research and
brokerage services received from client commissions is not required,
nor is an accounting of the value of services that go to benefit specific
client accounts.
Moreover, SEC Rule 31a-1 requires investment companies, like
mutual funds, to maintain detailed quarterly records, including how
they divide brokerage commissions on transactions, any benefits
received, and the nature of those benefits.92 Rules like 204-2 and 31a-1
require advisers to maintain records on their soft dollar arrangements
and transactions, but specific retrospective disclosure of benefits
received and the allocation of those benefits is generally not required.
This inhibits clients’ ability to monitor advisers’ soft dollar
arrangements and makes it easier for unscrupulous advisers to misuse
or misappropriate client commission dollars.
II. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF SOFT DOLLARS
When advisers abuse soft dollar arrangements, their clients
suffer.93 Recognizing this, and in contrast to the permissive approach
taken by the United States, the European Union has sought to curb
these abuses by restricting adviser payments for research to specific
payment accounts,94 in turn limiting the long-held use of commissions
to obtain soft dollars.95 However, following the European Union model
or eliminating soft dollars entirely would be unwise: soft dollars, when
used appropriately, can be highly beneficial to investors.

90. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a) (2017). It appears that this Rule was first applied to keeping
records of transactions in soft dollars in the SEC’s 1986 Guidance. 1986 Guidance, supra note 54,
at *8.
91. 1986 Guidance, supra note 54, at *8.
92. 17 C.F.R. § 270.31a-1(b)(1) (2017).
93. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Report Faults ‘Soft Dollar’ Use by Brokers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
23,
1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/23/business/report-faults-soft-dollars-use-bybrokers.html [https://perma.cc/MQ7T-HA55] (presenting the criticism that advisers abuse clients’
soft dollars and do not provide adequate disclosure of their practices).
94. SEC Issues Relief for Research Payments Under MIFID II, FRONTLINE COMPLIANCE
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://frontlinecompliance.com/sec-issues-relief-for-research-payments-undersection-28e/ [https://perma.cc/L94B-XJVR].
95. The Future of Investment Research Post-MiFID II, BLOOMBERG INTELLIGENCE (Aug.
9, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/future-investment-research-post-mifid-ii/
[https://perma.cc/NW8P-2BQ2].
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This Part will explore some of the abuses that have emerged from
soft dollar arrangements, while also highlighting the benefits that soft
dollars can bring to investors if utilized appropriately.
A. Conflicts of Interest and Inadequate Disclosure Requirements Can
Result in Soft Dollar Abuses
The market for soft dollars purchased with client brokerage
commissions is estimated to exceed $1 billion per year.96 Although
most investment advisers participate in soft dollar arrangements,97 the
SEC has found that advisers frequently fail to provide meaningful
disclosures regarding these arrangements to their clients.98 A full 2
percent of soft dollar benefits obtained by advisers are unrelated to
research or brokerage services and, therefore, fall outside of the
Section 28(e) safe harbor.99 This constitutes approximately $20 million
per year. Soft dollars might be used to pay for advisers’ office rent,
salaries, travel expenses, financial certification exam review courses, or
industry association dues.100
The use of soft dollars outside the safe harbor without adequate
disclosure has prompted the SEC to bring administrative proceedings
against a multitude of investment advisers and broker-dealers.101 For
example, the SEC took action against Marvin & Palmer Associates,
Inc. for violating the Investment Advisers Act when it improperly
directed soft dollars to friends of the firm.102 There, Marvin & Palmer
directed its broker, with whom it had a soft dollar arrangement, to pay
invoices submitted by MacThom Associates, purportedly for
research.103 Although the broker paid MacThom $920,000, MacThom
only provided $63,000 worth of research to Marvin & Palmer.104 The
balance was in fact paid to compensate MacThom’s principal, who was
a close friend of Marvin & Palmer’s principal, as well as the family of a
deceased business associate for their efforts in making introductions

96. INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 2.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See 2006 Guidance, supra note 16 (listing administrative proceedings initiated by the
SEC).
102. Marvin & Palmer Assocs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1841, 1999 WL
777443, at *1 (Sept. 30, 1999).
103. Id. at *2.
104. Id.
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and business referrals early in the firm’s existence.105 Neither the
existence nor the terms of Marvin & Palmer’s soft dollar arrangement
were disclosed to its clients,106 and, aside from the $63,000 of research,
no benefit accrued to Marvin & Palmer’s clients from the payments to
MacThom.107 The SEC found Marvin & Palmer to have violated the
Investment Advisers Act through its improper soft dollar practices and
disclosures.108
In another recent, egregious example of soft dollar abuse, the
advisory firm J.S. Oliver used over $1.1 million in soft dollars to pay
expenses that benefited its principal and others.109 This included (1) a
$482,381 soft dollar payment to a former employee for operating its
soft dollar program, (2) a $329,365 payment to its principal’s former
spouse in connection with a marital settlement agreement, (3) $300,000
in rent payments to a company owned by its principal on a building the
principal sometimes used as his personal residence, and (4) $40,000 to
the St. Regis Residence Club in New York City for a timeshare its
principal maintained there.110 J.S. Oliver disclosed on Form ADV that
it might use soft dollars for research and brokerage services, but did
not disclose that soft dollars would be used for the four above
payments, which violated federal securities laws.111 The SEC found that
J.S. Oliver violated the Securities Exchange Act and Investment
Advisers Act,112 ordered that the firm pay $6,625,000 in civil monetary
penalties and disgorge $1,376,440, and banned its principal from the
securities industry.113
As these stories and others illustrate, soft dollars provide an
avenue for advisers to use client commissions to unjustly enrich
themselves. Inadequate disclosure requirements contribute to these
abuses. The lack of required reporting on the advisers’ actual use of
soft dollars allows unscrupulous advisers, as in both examples above,

105. Id.
106. In fact, Marvin & Palmer’s Form ADV responded “no” to the question whether it
“receiv[ed] some economic benefit . . . from a non-client in connection with giving advice to
clients.” Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *3–4.
109. J.S. Oliver Capital Mgmt., LP, Securities Act Release No. 10100, 2016 WL 3361166, at
*6 (June 17, 2016).
110. Id. at *7.
111. Id. at *8.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *10.
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to hide behind general Form ADV disclosures while actually using
client-generated soft dollars in ways inconsistent with the advisers’
disclosed policies. Disclosure requirements mandating that advisers
account specifically for their actual uses of soft dollars may deter these
abuses outright by enabling better client monitoring. At a minimum,
quantitative reporting requirements would be an additional hurdle
over which unscrupulous advisers would have to jump to successfully
misuse client commissions.114 Any mistake, however small, in preparing
false quantitative reports would make client detection of abuses more
likely by increasing clients’ ability to track soft dollar use across time
periods and categories.
Soft dollar arrangements invite abuses and conflicts of interest.
This is a strong reason for restricting or eliminating their use. But soft
dollars can provide benefits to investors, too. These benefits, discussed
immediately below, caution against an outright ban as the best solution
to the soft dollar problem.
B. The Benefits of Soft Dollars
When employed effectively, soft dollars can benefit client
accounts. Soft dollars provide managers with the opportunity to obtain
more and differentiated research, which can help them make better
decisions in managing client accounts.115 Soft dollars can also work to
bind both the broker’s and the adviser’s interests to those of the client,
reducing agency costs.116 Presumably due to these benefits, empirical

114. The proposed requirements would force those advisers still willing to lie on quantitative,
ex post disclosures to create fake ledgers and keep corresponding false reports in order to avoid
detection by clients.
115. See D. Bruce Johnsen, Using Bond Trades to Pay for Third-Party Research, *14–16
(George
Mason
Univ.
Law
and
Econ.
Research
Paper
No.
10–33),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1647277
[https://perma.cc/GHF7-NUSP]
(noting that active managers’ returns from stock-picking can be persistently successful, and that
private money managers can use investment research to increase client returns). Maintaining the
availability of research was an important reason for implementing the safe harbor in the first
place. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Future Structure of the Securities Markets, 37 Fed. Reg.
5286, 5290 (Feb. 4, 1972) [hereinafter Future Structure of the Securities Markets] (noting that “it
is . . . essential that . . . the viability of the process by which research is produced and disseminated
not be impaired”).
116. See Johnsen, supra note 1, at 87, which discusses how advisers, brokers, and clients can
increase their wealth by structuring their relationships more efficiently through the use of soft
dollars. Soft dollars can also bind the broker and adviser to the client, thereby decreasing agency
costs across multiple dimensions, including quality, timeliness, and price. Id.
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research has shown that accounts managed by advisers that participate
in soft dollar arrangements earn higher risk-adjusted returns.117
Soft dollars also benefit client accounts by increasing the total
availability of research on the market and facilitating its transfer.118
Simply put, when more information is available, advisers can make
better decisions in allocating client capital to its most efficient uses. The
more varied and broad the information an adviser can receive, the
more informed an adviser can be in making investment decisions for
his clients.119 Without soft dollars, broker-dealers would be less likely
to invest in the capacity to produce investment research,120 which has
not been historically profitable for full-service brokerages. Soft dollar
arrangements incentivize brokers to invest in research services, thus
providing advisers “with a continuous flow of information and opinions
on securities, thereby leading in theory to confidence and better
judgments.”121
Soft dollars can also work to align the adviser’s incentives with the
client’s interests. As with most principal-agent relationships, there
exists in the adviser-client relationship the possibility of “shirking,”
where the adviser exerts less effort than the client would prefer.122
Because the adviser’s fee is typically based on assets under
management, his compensation is only indirectly dependent on his
ability to create investment gains for his clients.123 This fee structure
117. See Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 71 (finding that increasing the use of premium
commissions to obtain soft dollars “increases performance by 4.3 basis points per quarter, or
about 13 basis points annually”).
118. Future Structure of the Securities Markets, supra note 115 (“[T]he general availability of
information concerning virtually every aspect of operations and prospects of corporate issuers has
been one of the most important elements . . . contribut[ing] to phenomenal growth [in the
American capital markets].”).
119. See THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, SOFT DOLLARS AND OTHER TRADING
ACTIVITIES § 1:20, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2017) (stating that additional research
“should result in the most effective management of client accounts”).
120. See id. (engaging the argument that, if research were only available via hard dollars, a
significant number of institutions would choose not to develop research capabilities, given how
difficult it is to make research a profitable line of business).
121. Id.
122. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (noting that agency costs,
which arise in any principal-agent relationship, are closely related to the problem of shirking).
123. Typically, when an investment adviser creates gains for a client, the adviser’s
compensation grows in tandem with the base of assets under management. However, most
advisers do not receive compensation based on a portion of the gains themselves. For this reason,
“even the highest-paid fund managers receive just a small share of any wealth increase they
generate for the fund.” Johnsen, supra note 1, at 87.
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disincentivizes advisers from exerting sufficient effort to research
securities and make profitable trades for clients, as they do not directly
reap the benefits of those activities.124 Further, if the adviser’s contract
states that he must bear all the costs of inputs into the investment
process, such as research, he will likely shirk by devoting fewer
resources to research, thereby reducing his costs and increasing his
profitability.125
Soft dollar arrangements counteract shirking by binding advisers’
interests to those of their clients. By tying transaction execution to
research at a fixed ratio, advisers’ incentives become tied to their
clients’ incentives.126 Soft dollar arrangements allow advisers to
increase their access to investment research by upping the number of
transactions in their clients’ accounts—more transactions, more
research—which reduces shirking. But because brokerage commission
costs are larger than the soft dollar benefits received in each
transaction, and commissions come directly out of clients’ holdings,
advisers must only increase trading when the corresponding research
will justify the costs by increasing returns on future trades.127
Otherwise, the research earned through overtrading would result in a
drag on client returns, causing the market to punish the adviser through
fleeing clients. Ultimately, soft dollar arrangements cause advisers to
be more proactive in managing client accounts, but only when the
potential to benefit the client’s portfolio exists.
While compensating the adviser based on performance could also
help alleviate shirking, fees based on assets under management are an
industry norm. Threatening this norm would likely generate
substantial pushback from advisers looking for low-risk revenue.
Further, it could deter advisers from contracting with young investors,
who have a greater capacity for risk, or force the cost of advisory
services to prohibitively high levels. But another avenue—subsidizing

124. See id. (asserting that advisers will have too little incentive to perform well-researched
trades if they do not benefit directly from research-related gains).
125. See id. (maintaining that advisers will have too little incentive to perform well-researched
trades if they have to pay for research out of their own pockets).
126. See id. at 99 (explaining that tying investment research to execution at a fixed rate
requires the adviser to “use investment research and executions in equal proportions,” leading
the adviser to “devote an even greater level of inputs to identifying profitable portfolio trades”).
127. See id. (observing that tying research availability to portfolio executions at a fixed rate
aligns the client and adviser’s interests to promote beneficial trading).
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the adviser’s costs of generating profitable trades—can prevent
shirking.128
Soft dollar arrangements also tie the interests of broker-dealers to
those of the client. Like advisers, brokers are also prone to shirk. For
instance, a broker might search haphazardly for better prices, thus
leaking information on impending trades, or simply execute a trade
carelessly, rather than working hard to ensure the price impact of the
trade works in the client’s favor.129 Compounding this problem is the
fact that the true costs of effecting a trade are virtually impossible to
measure in the short run—the value of a broker can typically only be
seen over time through repeated trading.130
However, soft dollar arrangements can discourage broker shirking
by giving advisers discretion over transaction volume. Recall that it is
common for brokers to provide up-front research credits to advisers
with the expectation that the advisers will cover the costs of that
research by directing trades at premium commissions to the broker in
the future.131 The adviser, though, is under no obligation to continue to
direct trades to the broker and can walk away at any time, retaining the
research.132 This arrangement helps to decrease broker shirking and to
tie brokers’ interests to those of the client. In these situations, the
broker has effectively fronted a performance bond to the adviser,
ensuring the adviser that the broker’s trading execution will be
successful,133 lest it lose both its investment in the fronted soft dollars
and future business from the adviser. The result is that the soft dollar
arrangement incentivizes the broker to effectively execute client trades
to protect its investment in the adviser.134 This decreased agency cost
should benefit the client’s portfolio through more favorable trade

128. Id. at 96.
129. See Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 62 (discussing agency problems in broker
executions and listing examples of shirking).
130. See Johnsen, supra note 1, at 87 (“[E]xecution quality, and especially ‘price impact,’ are
notoriously difficult to assess in the short run.”); Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 62 (“In noisy
security markets the quality of broker executions is impossible for the manager to know ex ante
and difficult to determine even ex post except over an extended course of trading.”).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 48–50.
132. Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 58 (“[T]he manager is free to terminate the broker at
any time with no legal obligation to make the promised trades.”).
133. Id. at 59 (“[T]he broker’s up-front provision of research constitutes a . . . performance
bond that benefits investors by assuring the quality of broker executions.”).
134. See id. at 64 (explaining that an up-front soft dollar payment is a “nonsalvageable capital
investment” that works to ensure quality performance).
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execution and better price impact, resulting in greater portfolio
returns.
In sum, conflicts of interest may—and often do—result in advisers
abusing soft dollars to the detriment of their clients. Soft dollar
arrangements, however, can actually help to mitigate conflicts of
interest and compel brokers and advisers to act in the best interests of
their clients. Furthermore, soft dollar arrangements work to increase
the universe of investment information available to advisers, allowing
advisers to be better informed and make decisions that lead to greater
risk-adjusted returns for their clients.135 In light of these benefits, the
United States should not follow the European Union model or ban soft
dollars entirely. Instead, less drastic changes in the regulatory
framework to deter or eliminate abuses are appropriate.
III. WHY THE SOFT DOLLAR SAFE HARBOR SHOULD BE REPEALED
The federal government has chosen to provide a safe harbor for
the use of soft dollars, protecting their use in the vast majority of
circumstances. But this safe harbor, combined with lackluster
disclosure requirements, has enabled some advisers to misuse their
clients’ commission dollars. Abuses persist, and advisers’ actions are
often hidden from view. Moreover, the safe harbor’s original
rationales—promoting the availability of investment research and
protecting advisers that use soft dollar arrangements but lack sufficient
technology to prove compliance with their fiduciary duties—no longer
hold, and the safe harbor runs contrary to general principles of agency
law and fiduciary duties. Thus, a reinvigorated regulatory framework
is necessary. The safe harbor should be repealed and replaced.
A. The Original Rationales for the Safe Harbor No Longer Hold
As the Supreme Court has explained, the primary purpose of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is
to “deter fraud and manipulative practices in the securities market, and
to ensure full disclosure of information material to investment
decisions.”136 Congress maintained this purpose when it created the
soft dollar safe harbor as part of the Securities Act Amendments in
135. See id. at 71 (explaining that account performance improves when advisers increase the
use of premium commissions).
136. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“One of [the Exchange Act’s] central purposes is to protect investors
through the requirement of full disclosure by issuers of securities . . . .”).
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1975, which sought to promote both consumer protection and strong
capital markets.137 But while the safe harbor may have been the best
available mechanism at the time to further those objectives, its
rationales no longer hold today.
The legislative history surrounding the creation of the soft dollar
safe harbor reveals two primary concerns underlying its enactment.
First, the safe harbor alleviated adviser concerns that, without the safe
harbor, brokerage houses would find it unprofitable to continue to
produce the research that many advisers relied on.138 Second, the safe
harbor dispelled concerns that fiduciary duties would force advisers to
accept the lowest available execution-only commission rate, forgoing
premium broker agreements that included research benefits.139
Relatedly, advisers worried that their technological inability to
maintain records verifying that premium commissions benefitted a
specific client would make it difficult to demonstrate that they had not
breached their fiduciary duties.140
In hearings before the Subcommittee on Securities of the
Commission on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, four brokerage
firms issued a joint statement supporting the safe harbor.141 Without
the safe harbor, they concluded, there “would be a material reduction
in research services, particularly for smaller and medium-sized
financial institutions, and, in our view, a concurrent damaging of our
capital markets.”142 Ray Garrett, Jr., the Chairman of the SEC,
reiterated these concerns, noting that most advisers obtained some, if

137. H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321,
322 (explaining that the purpose of the amendments was “to provide greater investor protection
and bolster sagging investor confidence” while preserving an efficient market for capital).
138. See S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 69 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 247 (stating
that investment managers “have relied on the fact that portfolio activity would generate a supply
of research and analysis from the brokerage industry” and that “the future availability and quality
of research . . . could be jeopardized” without the safe harbor).
139. Id. at 70.
140. See 1979 Release, supra note 77, at *6 (stating that “a disclosure requirement of the
extent to which research was or will be obtained to benefit specific or all accounts of an investment
manager would be unreasonably complicated” and that, since research often benefits many
clients, it is “impracticable to ‘allocate’ specifically this benefit among those accounts”).
141. To Amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S.
249 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
94th Cong. 329–31 (1975) (statement of Charles H. Mott, President, Baker, Weeks & Co.; Richard
H. Jenrette, President, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp.; Donald B. Marron,
President, Mitchell, Hutchins, Inc.; and Bernard H. Garil, Vice President, Assistant to the
Managing Partner, Oppenheimer & Co.).
142. Id. at 330.
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not all of their research from brokerage firms executing their
transactions.143 Garrett worried that, without the safe harbor, brokerprovided research would become unprofitable,144 in turn leading to a
reduction in available research, which would harm those advisers that
were too small to develop their own research outfits.145 The Senate
agreed with this assessment and adopted the safe harbor.146
In a world where brokerage houses produced the vast majority of
investment research,147 Congress’s motivations for creating the soft
dollar safe harbor were well founded. But two developments since 1975
have weakened the safe harbor’s research-availability rationale. First,
assets have increasingly concentrated in the hands of large institutional
advisers that can afford in-house research systems.148 As discussed
above, one of the initial goals of the safe harbor was to protect research
availability for small advisers. Although institutionalization has led
many of these shops to disappear,149 the asset management industry
was once dominated by small managers that offered active portfolio
management services.150 Since 1975, however, “the largest institutional
investors have quadrupled their holdings in the equity market.”151
Economies of scale have allowed these large institutional investors to
develop their in-house research services, decreasing their reliance on
broker-provided research. Today, where small managers in need of
protection are fewer and further between, the harms resulting from the
143. Id. at 201 (statement of Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman, SEC).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 202.
146. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 70 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 248 (concluding
that “the future availability and quality of research and other services in an environment of
unfixed rates could be jeopardized, with potentially harmful consequences to all investors”).
147. See Johnsen, supra note 31, at 1556 (stating that “the small number of full-service
brokerage houses that dominated the NYSE produced most of the investment research”).
148. See, e.g., What We Do, BLACKROCK, (last visited Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.
blackrock.com/corporate/insights/blackrock-investment-institute/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/
9DWP-EV95] (noting that the BlackRock Investment Institute “originate[s] research on markets,
economics, portfolio construction and cross-asset themes such as geopolitics”).
149. See Itzhak Ben-David, Developments in the Asset Management Industry, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (July 20, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2017/07/20/developments-in-the-asset-management-industry/ [https://perma.cc/6KA5-MQDY]
(finding that, in 1980, the top ten asset managers owned about 5 percent of the U.S. market, but,
by 2016, the top ten managers owned about 23 percent).
150. Id.
151. Itzhak Ben-David, The Granular Nature of Large Institutional Investors, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2016/08/01/the-granular-nature-of-large-institutional-investors/
[https://perma.cc/P6WDZWXD].
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safe harbor far outweigh its potential benefits. This institutionalization
eliminates one of the original justifications for the safe harbor.
Second, independent research providers—companies that do not
act as brokers, but provide research reports and conclusions for a direct
fee—have taken a greater share of the research market. Access to
independent research allows smaller advisers to purchase research
outside of a soft dollar arrangement, obviating the need to bolster
broker-provided research via the safe harbor. Independent researchers
have been growing and are expected to reach twenty percent market
share soon.152
Technological advancements have also weakened the safe
harbor’s fiduciary-duty rationale. Advisers have a duty “to act
primarily for the benefit of [the client] in matters connected with [their]
undertaking.”153 There is no reason that this duty cannot be met while
still directing client trades to premium brokers in exchange for research
and execution.154 However, actually proving that premium
commissions primarily benefit individual clients can pose a challenge.
In 1975, advisers did not have the technology to accurately record,
track, and store the multitude of soft dollar transactions they
undertook in order to prove that the research benefitted the clients
whose commissions generated it.155 Today, widely-available record152. Robin Wigglesworth, Final Call for the Research Analyst?, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/85ee225a-ec4e-11e6-930f-061b01e23655
[https://perma.cc/MR27XZFV].
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
154. Many advisers believed that the safe harbor was necessary to satisfy the fiduciary rule
that a principal cannot receive a benefit from its relationship with an agent. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“The trustee is under a duty to the
beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”); Jorden, supra note
27, at 1108 (stating the “general rule” that a fiduciary “is not entitled to receive a benefit from the
administration of the trust property . . . other than as compensation for services”). This is likely
mistaken. The better way to view soft dollars is simply as a different form of compensation for
advisers’ services. Advisers do not receive separate benefits from soft dollars; they simply receive
a subsidy for their expenses in managing their clients’ accounts. Without the soft dollar safe
harbor, advisers would have to use soft dollars to benefit commission-paying clients. Further, if
soft dollars were prohibited, advisers would likely just charge higher management fees to cover
the cost of research. See Letter from Kurt N. Schacht & Jonathan J. Stokes, CFA Ctr. for Fin.
Mkt. Integrity, to Florence E. Harmon, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 6, 2008),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-08/s72208-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW39-CT8Z] (stating
the argument that advisers paying hard dollars for research would lead to increased fees for the
investors). Even if soft dollar arrangements are seen as conferring a separate benefit, advisers can
avoid breaching their fiduciary duties by gaining clients’ consent and fully disclosing the material
facts surrounding the transaction. See infra Part IV.
155. See 1979 Release, supra note 77, at *6, *8 (explaining that disclosure of the extent to
which research was obtained to benefit specific accounts would be “unreasonably complicated”
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keeping and storage technology enables advisers to track with ease
client commissions, the soft dollars generated from those commissions,
and whether soft dollars benefit the clients paying for them. With this
technology, advisers no longer need to worry about being unable to
prove adherence to their fiduciary duties when using soft dollars.
Taken together, the institutionalization of the investment
industry, along with advances in available investment management
technology since 1975, have significantly weakened the main rationales
for enacting the safe harbor.
B. The Safe Harbor Conflicts with General Principles of Agency Law
and Fiduciary Duties
Modern federal securities regulations have codified common-law
fiduciary duties for investment advisers. While, on its face, Section 206
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940156 appears to be a general
prohibition against fraud and deceit, courts have construed the law to
apply broad fiduciary duties to advisers.157 Under these fiduciary
duties, advisers must act in their clients’ best interests,158 must fully
disclose to clients all material facts affecting their relationship,159 and
must seek best execution for the client’s trades.160 In short, investors
should be able to expect that advisers will put client interests first when

and prohibitively costly, especially for smaller advisers who would have to make computations
manually).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012).
157. E.g., Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 501 (3d Cir. 2013); see Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977) (understanding that the Court in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), established “federal fiduciary standards for
investment advisers”).
158. E.g., SEC v. Nutmeg Grp., LLC, 162 F. Supp. 3d. 754, 778 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Belmont, 708
F.3d at 503.
159. E.g., Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 197. The standard of materiality is
whether a reasonable client or prospective client would have considered the information
important in deciding to invest with the adviser. SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 643 (D.C. Cir.
1992); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (clarifying that, for an omitted
fact to be material, there must be a substantial likelihood that disclosure would have significantly
altered a reasonable investor’s view of the available information). Soft dollar arrangements are
material because of the conflicts of interest that can arise from an adviser’s receipt of a benefit in
exchange for directing client trades to a broker and, thus, must be disclosed. Renaissance Capital
Advisers, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1688, 1997 WL 794479, at *3 (Dec. 22, 1997).
160. See In re Hughes, Exchange Act Release No. 4048, 1948 WL 29537, at *5 (1948) (“A
corollary of the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty to his principal is his duty to obtain . . . the best price
discoverable in the exercise of reasonable diligence.”), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d
969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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managing portfolios,161 acting with the care and loyalty required of a
fiduciary.162
The soft dollar safe harbor runs contrary to these general
principles. The safe harbor allows an adviser to consider the
reasonableness of a trade transaction in terms of “his overall
responsibilities with respect to the accounts”163 he manages. Thus, the
adviser need not “show that specific services benefited specific
accounts.”164 This allows the adviser to put the interests of third-party
clients—and those of his advisory business as a whole—ahead of the
interests of the client paying for the trade, contrary to the adviser’s
common law duty “not to use property of the principal for the agent’s
own purposes or those of a third party.”165 Moreover, by allowing
advisers to use the research generated from one client’s trades to aid
other clients, the safe harbor relieves advisers of the common-law duty
not to acquire material benefits from third parties through transactions
conducted for the principal.166
In this regard, the soft dollar safe harbor is somewhat unique. In
other dealings with the client, advisers must adhere to fiduciary duties
and the general principles of agency law. They must make full
disclosure of all material facts affecting the adviser-client
relationship,167 take reasonable care to avoid misleading clients,168 seek
best execution of client trades,169 and act “at all times in the best

161. See id. at *4 (stating that “[t]he very function of furnishing investment counsel on a fee
basis . . . cultivates a confidential and intimate relationship and imposes a duty upon [the adviser]
to act in the best interests of her clients and to make only such recommendations as will best serve
such interests.”).
162. See Robert J. Moran & Cathy G. O’Kelly, Soft Dollars and Other Traps for the
Investment Adviser: An Analysis of Brokerage Placement Practices, 1 DEPAUL BUS. L.J 45, 55
(1989) (stating that “clients can reasonably expect that their Advisers will adhere to the industry
standards for the duties of care, skill, loyalty and any other duties . . . imputed to an Adviser.”).
163. 15 U.S.C § 78bb(e)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
164. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 70 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 248.
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
166. See Jorden, supra note 27, at 1108 (stating the “general rule” that a fiduciary “is not
entitled to receive a benefit from the administration of the trust property . . . other than as
compensation for services”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1959).
167. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
168. Id.
169. See In re Hughes, Exchange Act Release No. 4048, 1948 WL 29537, at *5 (1948) (“A
corollary of the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty to his principal is his duty to obtain . . . the best price
discoverable in the exercise of reasonable diligence.”), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d
969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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interest” of the investor.170 Because these agency and fiduciary
principles are present in all other aspects of the adviser-client
relationship, the safe harbor appears out of place in the overall adviser
regulatory scheme.
There does not appear to be any principled reason to maintain the
safe harbor in the adviser regulatory scheme. The safe harbor conflicts
with fiduciary duties, and its original justifications no longer hold. In
addition, repealing the safe harbor would remove the air of leniency
surrounding advisers’ use of soft dollars, thus deterring abuses.
In lieu of the safe harbor, Congress and the SEC should adopt
increased and particularized reporting standards that require advisers
to show clients their specific allocations and uses of soft dollars. By
making transgressions more easily discoverable and, presumably,
punishable by clients, such requirements would provide a strong
incentive to avoid self-dealing and adhere to fiduciary duties.
IV. A CONSENT AND REPORTING FRAMEWORK FOR SOFT DOLLARS
Beginning with the Securities Act of 1933171 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,172 the federal government has primarily
regulated securities markets through disclosure requirements.173
Disclosure is meant to “allow[] investors to make fully informed
investment decisions,” thereby increasing efficiency and deterring
adviser misconduct.174 The current mandatory disclosures regarding
soft dollar arrangements, however, do not enable investors to make
intelligent, informed decisions in evaluating whether to retain
investment advisers. As discussed above, investment advisers are
generally not required to make detailed quantitative disclosures about
their procurement and use of soft dollars. Whereas many entities, like
public companies, must periodically disclose the financial results of
operations, thereby reporting to the investor what the company
actually did with the invested funds, advisers must only describe their
general soft dollar policies. This lack of detailed disclosure hinders the
main goals of the disclosure regime.

170. SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 146 (1st Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds en banc 597
F.3d 436 (2010).
171. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).
172. Id. §§ 78a–78qq.
173. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward
a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 151 (2006).
174. Id. at 153–54.
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Mandated detailed disclosures of soft dollar use would force
advisers to periodically recount and relay their activities to their clients,
deterring potential misconduct and promoting honest and competent
behavior.175 Congress should repeal the Section 28(e) soft dollar safe
harbor176 but permit advisers to use soft dollar arrangements subject to
general fiduciary duties. This would require advisers to gain client
consent to soft dollar arrangements and disclose the results of their
use.177 Furthermore, the SEC, a body with greater flexibility to adapt
its rules to developments in the soft dollar landscape,178 should
promulgate regulations requiring more substantive disclosure of
advisers’ soft dollar arrangements and the benefits flowing therefrom.
This middle-ground scheme should allow investors to reap the benefits
of soft dollar arrangements while limiting the costs of monitoring their
advisers, resulting in fewer abuses.
New regulations on soft dollar use should take the form of a twopronged consent and reporting framework. First, to promote client
awareness about soft dollar arrangements and their potential for
conflicts of interest, advisers should be required to obtain consent from
all clients to engage in soft dollar arrangements before transacting on
their behalf. This consent should be required at the time the adviser
enters into an advisory relationship with the client, taking the simple
form of a written document describing what soft dollar arrangements
are, how advisers use them to benefit clients, and how the
arrangements may create conflicts of interest. The document should
prompt clients to assent to the adviser paying premium commissions
when transacting on behalf of the client and receiving soft dollar
benefits in return. Aside from the request for consent, the document
should include many of the same disclosures about soft dollars that are
currently required by Form ADV.179 Since advisers provide other
documentation to their clients at the outset of their relationship,
175. See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage
What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (1996) (stating that corporate executives
“behave more honestly, diligently, and competently” with mandatory periodic disclosures).
176. See supra Part III.
177. See Jorden, supra note 27; see also text accompanying note 159.
178. See, e.g., Garrett F. Bishop & Michael A. Coffee, Note, A Tale of Two Commissions: A
Compendium of the Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements Faced by the SEC & CFTC, 32 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 565, 566 (2013) (“Instead of specifying the precise parameters of reform
within the [Dodd-Frank] Act itself, Congress delegated this responsibility to myriad
regulatory agencies better equipped with the requisite expertise to shape financial reform.”).
179. See supra Part I.D (discussing the disclosure requirements of soft dollars generally and
those required on Form ADV specifically).
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including the consent form is an inexpensive way to raise investor
awareness about soft dollar arrangements. Ultimately, requiring
consent puts the decision on how to manage soft dollars’ potential
conflicts of interest in the hands of the client himself, and helps the
adviser better understand what the client believes is in his best
interest.180
After receiving consent to engage in soft dollar arrangements, the
SEC should require advisers to provide periodic reports to each
consenting client, quantitatively detailing client commissions paid and
the benefits generated and qualitatively describing the procedures used
over the latest period to allocate trades to broker-dealers. The
quantitative disclosures should include at the very least: (1) the total
amount of premium commission dollars the client paid over the period,
(2) the total premium commission dollars paid over the period across
all consenting client accounts, (3) the total amount that would have
been spent had the adviser directed the individual client’s trades to a
discount broker, as well as the aggregate figure for all consenting
accounts, (4) the total dollar value of soft dollar benefits the adviser
received over the period and a breakdown of those benefits by
category,181 and (5) the value of any brokerage services received by the
individual client over the period. These individualized reports on soft
dollar usage should be included in the adviser’s normal periodic reports
on investment performance. With these five required disclosures,
clients would be better able to monitor advisers’ soft dollar practices
and ensure that the benefits received and commissions paid are in their
best interest.
It is worth noting that, because soft dollar arrangements work on
a fungible credit system, it is not always possible for advisers to list the
specific research services received in exchange for specific premium
trading commissions.182 However, this fact does not diminish the value
of required disclosures. The five proposed disclosures would still allow
180. It is possible that, for potential clients with small portfolios, some advisers would treat
the consent requirement as a contract of adhesion, allowing them to turn non-consenting clients
away. However, this should not be overly concerning: these rejections would create a market for
advisers who appreciate the decision to forgo premium commission arrangements. And, more
fundamentally, it is unlikely that advisers would choose to miss out on the revenue that new
clients—even those wishing to avoid soft dollar arrangements—present.
181. These categories could include: domestic economic research, international economic
research, small/mid/large capitalization value or growth equity research, or certain types of fixedincome research. Regardless of breakdown, the categories would be required to cover all types of
research received and include one for brokerage services.
182. See supra Part I.B.
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advisers to demonstrate that each client received a share of research
and/or brokerage services proportional to their share of the aggregate
premium commissions the adviser directed over the period.
By comparing individual commissions paid with aggregate
commissions paid, clients could calculate their shares of the aggregate
premium commissions over the period. Then, by comparing those
figures to the amount that would have been spent had the adviser used
discount brokers, clients could determine how much of their premium
commissions went toward research or brokerage services. Finally,
clients could cross-check whether they were receiving at least a
proportional share of the adviser’s accrued soft dollar benefits by
comparing these figures with the amount and type of soft dollar
benefits received.183 Thus, with a bit of arithmetic, these five reported
metrics would empower clients to better police their advisers, ensure
their adherence to the law and the client’s interests, and determine
whether or not to continue employing them.
In addition to periodic, individualized client reports, the SEC
should require a similar public filing. A publicly filed form with
aggregated quantitative disclosures would be helpful to clients and
prospective clients in three ways. First, public disclosures supplement
policing by providing individual clients and consumer protection
groups—especially unsophisticated investors that are unable to make
use of the individualized quantitative disclosures themselves—with the
means to ensure adviser compliance. Second, public disclosures enable
potential clients to investigate an adviser’s soft dollar usage prior to
entering into an advisory relationship. Third, requiring quantitative
disclosure of the rates advisers pay in premium commissions may spur
market competition, resulting in decreases in the average premium
commission rate in the market.
Compared to their value to clients, the cost of these public
disclosures would be minor. If the proposed individualized reporting
requirements are implemented, public disclosure, which would utilize
the same data, would only amount to a minor incremental expense.
Of course, quantitative disclosure requirements are still a weak
defense against advisers that are willing to simply lie to their clients. In
all likelihood, the Marvin & Palmer adviser who lied to his clients on

183. Because it is possible for many clients to benefit from a single research report, the
aggregate client value of soft dollar benefits might exceed one hundred percent of the dollar value
of those benefits. For example, a report on the U.S. economic outlook would be valuable to most
investors.
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Form ADV184 would still have found a way manipulate the data behind
the suggested reporting framework’s required metrics. However,
under the proposed reporting requirements, only the most brazen
would attempt such deception. It is easy to check a “no” box on Form
ADV, as Marvin & Palmer did, but it is much more difficult to craft
consistently false quantitative reports, especially across multiple clients
and time periods. There is only so much the law can do to prevent
illegal behavior before it occurs, but the proposed quantitative
reporting requirements would make misrepresentations that much
harder.
For disclosures and reporting to be effective, the client must read
and be able to understand the provided information.185 The large
amounts of information contained in disclosure forms can be difficult
to process, and many clients are unsophisticated investors.186 To
encourage reading and understanding, then, the above suggested soft
dollar reporting requirements limit the data provided to five easily
defined figures.187 Further, most of these figures are amenable to
graphical presentation, which could enhance client understanding and
increase the odds that clients actually read the reports. It is true that,
after leading the client to water, the SEC cannot make him drink. But
the simplicity and clarity of the five suggested metrics increase the
chance that the client quenches his thirst and monitors his adviser.
Although the costs of complying with mandatory disclosures can
be enormous, the proposed reporting requirements are unlikely to be
prohibitively expensive. It is true that “[c]reating, gathering, analyzing,
summarizing, and drafting all the information necessary to generate
the required disclosures involves extensive time and effort.”188 And
once compiled and drafted, the costs of disseminating information to

184. See supra Part II.A.
185. See Jay T. Brandi, Securities Practitioners and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of Comments
and a Ranking of States by Stringency of Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 689, 692 (1985) (stating that
an “assumption underlying . . . required disclosure[s] is that the information . . . is both read and
comprehended”).
186. See Ripken, supra note 173, at 160 (noting that “people are boundedly rational and have
only limited cognitive abilities to process vast amounts of complex information at once”).
187. See id. at 160–62 (discussing the information overload problem in required disclosures);
Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 451–52 (2003) (encouraging consideration of how information
will be used before including it in required disclosures and concluding that “[m]ore information
is not per se better than less”).
188. Ripken, supra note 173, at 188.
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clients can also be substantial.189 However, as previously mentioned,
advisers are required to “make and keep true, accurate and current . .
. books and records”190 containing “sufficient details relating to each
[soft dollar] transaction.”191 Because of this requirement, advisers are
already obligated to maintain records of the many transactions they
take on behalf of client accounts—records that provide the data that
underlies each of the five proposed metrics. Accordingly, the proposed
reporting requirements do nothing to increase the cost of creating and
gathering information. Analyzing, summarizing, and drafting reports
does still generate some costs, but the same software an adviser uses
for recordkeeping can easily analyze and summarize individual client
reports. Tools like these make a reporting framework for soft dollar
uses relatively inexpensive.
A mandatory consent and reporting framework would expose
improper soft dollar uses, or at least make them harder to conceal. It
would also make advisers think twice before abusing client commission
dollars and assure clients that their commission dollars are being spent
in their best interest. While there is no firm data on the cost savings
that would accrue to clients by limiting the misuse of their commission
dollars, we can guess that, given size of the industry,192 the savings
would likely be substantial. Independent of those savings, the benefits
of increased transparency, deterrence, and easier monitoring support
implementing a mandatory reporting framework. For these reasons,
the framework offers a workable alternative to an outright ban on soft
dollar arrangements, ensuring that advisers use soft dollars
appropriately for their clients’ benefit.
CONCLUSION
The soft dollar safe harbor and inadequate reporting requirements
have encouraged abuses of soft dollar arrangements. The safe harbor
is outdated and runs contrary to agency and fiduciary principles. It
should be repealed. Instead, the use of soft dollars should be governed
by traditional fiduciary duties. To bolster these duties, the SEC should
implement a consent and reporting framework—requiring advisers to

189. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 707–08 (1984) (discussing the direct costs of required disclosures
and noting that these direct costs are in the billions of dollars per year).
190. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a) (2017).
191. 1986 Guidance, supra note 54, at *8.
192. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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gain client consent before engaging in soft dollar arrangements and
implementing periodic reporting requirements regarding the use of
soft dollars. As Louis Brandeis famously said, “[s]unlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants.”193 By raising awareness of the use of soft
dollars and exposing advisers’ practices to the light of day, this
framework would deter advisers from using soft dollars improperly and
empower clients to more easily monitor their agents.

193. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1914).

